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Price controls result in rents and in rent-seeking. Where the rent-
seeking dissipates the rents, the costs of the price controls are
magnified enormously above the traditional resource misalloca-
tion costs.  But there are cases  where rent-seeking does not
dissipate the rents.
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In January 1990, Poland embarked on a "Big  waiting lists.  The other, allocation to preferred
Bang" approach to economic reform that in  individuals, wasted some resources through
addition to macroeconomic reform decontrolled  classically rent-seeking or directly unproductive
virtually all prices and devalued tHe  Polish zloty.  profit-seeking (DUP) activities.  But it also had
These two reforms eliminated virtually ovemight  the socially beneficial effects of improving
massive excess demand for many Polish com-  efficiency in other state-owned firms. (In some
modities and allowed the authlorities  to make the  firms, the autos were awarded to the most
zloty internally convertible.  productive coal miners or factory workers
which improved productivity in government
To assess the impact of these reforms on the  factories where lack of effort had been a prob-
Polish market for autos and color televisions,  lem.)
Tarr develops a differentiated product model, in
which consumers maximize utility and finns  Tarr also -hows that import liberalization
maximize profits subject to rationing constraints  produces greater benefits when there are domes-
and price controls.  tic price controls with rent dissipation, because
import liberalization reduces the rent.
Color televisiotns  were rationed by queucing.
Tarr finds that wasteful rent dissipation in color  All things being equal, the elimination of
tclevisions exactly offset the rents because  price controls for both autos and televisions had
qucues formed thiat  dissipated the rert:_. Rent  the effect of decreasing imports, as more domes-
dissipation was roughly 10 times the traditional  tic autos were produced and sold. The implica-
triangle of Harberger resource misallocation  tion is that - contrary to the Polish
costs - so the benefit of price decontrol which  government's intention - price controls were a
eliminated both rent dissipation and resource  trade distortion that increased imports:  that is,
misallocation was a substantial 0.46 percent of  they implicitly subsidized imports.  Tarr esti-
gross domestic product.  mates the rate of subsidy of imports (the ad
valorem rate of subsidy to imports that would
With autos, howevcr, rationing was by two  increase imports to the level before price con-
melltods, which Tarr assesses as not significantly  trols were eliminated) to be 43 percent for autos
increasing the social costs of the price controls  and 22 percent for color TVs.
above the Harberger costs.  One method was
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I. INTRODUCTION
In  January  of 1990,  Poland  embarked  on a  major  reform  (known  an the "Big
Bang") with  the  aim  of  creating a  market economy. In  addition to  the
macroeconomic  features  of  the  reform,  the  reform  included  decontrol  of  virtually
all prices  and a large  devaluation  of the Polish  zloty.  These latte:  reforms
eliminated  virtually  overnight  the massive  excess  demand  that had existed  for
many  Polish  commoditiee  and  allowed  the  authorities  to  make  the  zloty  internally
convertlble.
The macroeconomic features and accomplishments of the PolLsh reforms have
been extensively analyzed and debated (see, Rocha and Coricelli, 1990#  Rosati,
1990; Pinto, Coricelli and de la Calle, 19901 and Lipton and Sachs, 1990). The
most notable success of the program is that  it succeeded  in quLckly stopping
hyperinflation. The first three  papers cLted  above,  however, have reported a
decline in  industrial output  during the  first  8  months of 1990  of between 25 and
30 percent, compared with the seame  period one year earlier. Lipton and Sachs
(1990)  strongly  contend,  however, that  the  output  decline grossly  exaggerates  the
fall  in  living  standards  in  Poland  because  by  freeing  prices  the  reform
eliminated  shoLtages  and  queues  and  the  aesociated  waste  of  time.1
Alternatively  stated,  when  one  takes  Lnto account  the huge waste  of resources  ln
rent-seeking (or directly unproductive profit seeking "DUP" activities) of the2
pre-1990  regime,  there  would  be  little  or  no  fall  in  the  1990  atandard  of living.
These  issues  poLnt  to  the  need  for  empirical  estimates  at  the  microeconomic
level  of the impact  of price decontrol  and trade liberalization,  where the
estimates  incorp'.rate  an assessment  of any  additlonal  benefits  from  eliminating
socially  unproductive  rent-seeking  activity  due  to the  price  controls. This is
all the more true insofar  am Hungary  and Czechoslovakia  have made analogous
reforms. 2 In  this  regard,  however,  while  the  early  theory  of  rent-seeking  tended
to focus  on cases  where rent-seeking  activities  exactly  dissipated  available
rents,  many  models  (which  are  surveyed  in  appendix  C)  have  now  been  developed  in
which,  depending  on the nature  of the market  and  the method  of allocation  of
rents,  wasteful  rent-seeking  actLvities  may be  greater  or  less  than  the  available
rents.
This paper examines  two important  markets in Polands autos and color
televLiions.  In so doing it provides  empirical  assessments  of  two  phenomena,
frequently  discussed,  but  rarely  estimated:  (1)  microeconomic  policy  changes  in
socialist  economies,  in  this  case  price  decontrol  and  trade  liberalization;  and
(2) the extent  of rent-seeking  (or  DUP) activities  in two significant  price
controlled  markets,  and the relative  magnitude  of the traditional  distortion
costs  and  unproductive  rent-seeking. 3
We  decompoae the  analysis of  the  coots of price control into two
components:  the classical ("Harberger")  triangle  of distortion  costs;  and a
"Tullock"  rectangle  of rents.  The extent  of rent  dissipation  has  a very  strong
effect on the estimates.  As we explain  below,  we assess  that wasteful  rent
dissipatLon  in  color  televisions  exactly  offset  the  rents  because  queues  formed
which  diLsipated  the  rents  Ln  the  manner  of  the  model  developed  by  Barzel  (1974).
Then,  based  on  our  model  in  color  televLsions  (calibrated  to  1988  data  and  in  the3
central elasticity case)  the rent dissipation is estimated to equal about 10
times the triangle of distortion costs, for a  total coat of .46  percent of Polish
GDP.  In autos, however, rationing was by two methods which we assess as not
significantly  increasing  the  social  costs  of  the  price  controls  above  the
Harberger costs. one method was waiting lists.  The other method, allocation to
Preferred individuals, involved the waste of some resources through classical
rent-seeking  or DUP activities, but also had socially beneficial effects of
improving efficiency  in  other  state owned enterprises,  i.e., of reducing X-
inefficiency in other industries.  In  autos  then, with .ao  rent dissipation, the
triangle of distortion costs was the entire cost of the price control program in
autos; it equaled .29 percent of GDP.
We also find that ceterus 2aribus, the elimination of price controls, in
both autos and  televisions, had  the effect of  decreasing imports as  more domestic
autos were produced and sold. This implies that, contrary to any desire of the
government of Poland, the price controls were a distortion to the trade regime
resulting in increased imports, i.e., they were an imvlicit subsidy to imports.
The rate of implicit subsidization (defined  as the ad valorem rate of subsidy to
imports  that  would  increase  imports to  their  original  level  prior  to  the
elimination of the price controls) is estimated to be 43  percent in autos and 22
percent in color TvB.
The foreign trade regime  of  Poland, as of early 1989,  was largely open  with
one significant exception: exporting enterprises had to surrender, on average,
70 percent of their foreign exchange earnings to the central government at the
official  exchange  rate.4 This  represented  a  significant  disincentive  to
exports, because the official exchange rate  was about 20  percent of the parallel
market  exchange rate. Although foreign  exchange restraints  have been extensively4
analyzed at the theoretical  level, 5 these  of forts have not quantitatively
assessed the welfare effects of aggregate foreign exchange restraLnts in
particula,n  .aarkets.  The paper  also  Lnvestlgates  the LnterrelatLonshlp  between
the liberalization  of the foreign  exchange  policy  and  domestic  price  controls,
with  and  without  rent  dLesipation.  Constraining  imports  increasem  dmand  for  the
domeetic  p"rIe-  e-'trnlled  variety  of the  product;  this  will increase  the  rents
on the  domestic  product  and  may increase  wasteful  rent-seeking  activity.  it is
found,  therefore,  that  in  color  televisions,  with  dissipation  of  rents,  the  costs
of import  restraints  are  4  times  greater  when  the  effect  of the  rent  dissipation
in  the  market  for  domestic  autos  is incorporated.
It is found,  in  the central  elasticity  case,  the  traditional  di$tortion
costs of the foreign  exchange  distortions  in the autos  market  were about .1
percent of Polish  GDP, and  were about .05  percent in  color televisions.  In color
televisions,  the costs  were  augmented  by induced  wasteful  rent-seeking  for  the
domestic  variety;  thus,  the  total  costs  of the foreign  exchange  restraints  in
color  televisions  were about  .21  percent  of GDP.
The  paper  is  organized  as follows.  In  section  XI institutional  details  of
the  auto  and  color  TV  markets  in  Poland  are  dlicussed.  This  section  lays  out  the
stylized  facts  that  are  incorporated  in  the  model,  and  discusses  the  methods  of
allocating  autos and color Tvs in the context  of the rent-seeking  and rent
dissipation  literature.  Results  are  presented  in section  III.
In  appendix  A,  we  develop  the  model  of  the  Polish  auto  and  color  television
markets.  We  "benchmark"  the model to the policies  and stylized facts that
prevailed  in 1989. It is  a differentiated  product  model in which consumers
optimize  their  consumption  expenditures  across  commodities  subject  to rationing
constraints  on their  purchase  of domestic  autos  and  color  televisions,  and  ans
implicit  tariff  on imports  due  to  the  foreign  exchange  policy  (discussed  below);
firma  optimize  subject  to price  controls.  The model  explains  the  existence  of
permanent  excess  demand for  the rationed  commodity  at the controlled  prices.
Although  the results  of the  model  are intuitively  explained  through  the  use  of
graphs  ln section  IV,  the formal  derivatLon  and  some  of the  comparative  static
prnnasties  differ  ln  slanlifcant  ways  from  conventlonal  models  without  rationing.
These reaults are similar,  however,  to those obtained  by Neary and Roberts
(1980).  The  data  sources  &re  discussed  in  appendix  8,  and  in  appendix  C  we  revLew
the  literature  on  rent-seeking  (DUP)  activities  as  it  relates  to  rent  dissipatLon
under  prLce  controls.
II.  AUTO and  COLOR  TV MARKETS  IN  POLAND
Color  Wff
With  the  exception  of  the  method  of allocating  domestic  goods  under  price
control,  the  basic  structures  of  the  auto  and  color  TV  markets  in  Poland  Ln  1989
were similar.  Imported  and  domestic  TVs  are  not  homogeneous,  L.e.,  imported  TVs
are regarded as beLng of higher  qualLty.  Except for small tariffs and the
Lmplicit  tax on foreign  exchange  discussed  above,  importing  of color  TVs was
free.  one  did  not  need  to go through  the  official  foreign  trade  organization  to
import  the  TV,  and  foreLin  exchange  was  available  (subject  to  an implicit  import
tax) if  one had  enough  zloty.  Thus,  the  market  for  imported  color  TVs  cleared.
Domestic  color  TVs  were in  severe  shortage.  The  average  domestic  official
price in 1988 was controlled  at 394,000  zloty ($136  at the parallel  market
exchange  rate.)  At this  controlled  priee,  there  was  great  excess  demand.  Due  to
the  excess  demand,  the  supplies  were  allocated  in  a  negotiation  process  between
producers  and  Lnternal  trade  organizatLons  (with  a  representative  of  the  Ministry6
of Internal Market preeent). Internal trade organizations are: regional trade
organizations, which have retall outlete (GAe for each of the 50 voivodships)p
rural cooperatives  (CS Samopomoc Chlopska); and some small trading companies.
Sometimes, in an effort to avoid the price controls, producers sold TV sets to
their suppliers, demanding goods or services  which were also under price control
in return, in the fashion described by Kornai (1980).
The final consumer of the color TV, who wanted to pay the official price,
has to wait before stores for dayn or weeks until a shipment arrived. Those who
waited at the stores formed waiting lists, called "social  waiting lists." These
lists  determined who had the right to buy a TV at that particular store when a
shipment arrived. The rules  of the  waiting list  were  determined by the customers.
Although there were cases where t.le  lists were operated by the staff of the
stores, they were unusual. At least one person from the list had to be at the
store at all times, or a newcomer could start a list with his name at the top.
Normal procedure obliged everyone on the list to appear at the store at least
once per day at a  designatad time or his name would be deleted from the liet.
There were cases of people taking leave from work to assure that they would be
able  t) buy a color TV, and of people who waited in line so they could resell the
TV.
Domestic color TVs could be, and were, resold. There are open air markets
where goods are sold (not limited to color TVs), and they are also sold through
advertisements. This free market price is periodLcally reported in newspapers,
and in 1988 it  was two times the official price. Thus, the resale market for
color TVs (both  new and used) in Poland clears. Individuals who received a color
TV at the official price obtained a rent equal to the difference in  the price on7
the  resale market and the official price, but that rent has likely been
dissipated  through  lost  time  in the  queue.
Polieh autoœ and imported  autoo are not homogeneous  products. Poland
imports autos from a number  of foreign  countries including  Japan,  Germany,
Rweden,6  as  well  as  imports  from  the  former  Eastern  bloc  countries,  most  notably
from  Czechoslovakia  and  the  Soviet  Union.  Imported  vehicles  generally  sell  for
considerably  more  than  that  of domestic  vehicles  (on  the  domestic  free  market),
and  reflect  assessed  quality  premia  for  the imports  from  Western  countries. 7
After the  decontrol  of prices  in January  1990,  the  market  for  domestic
autos  in  Poland  cleared.  Prior  to  that  the  market  for  domestically  produced  autoo
was characterized  for many years by  severe shortages.  The  official prLce  of
domestically  produced  autos  was  controlled  at  a level  which  induced  great  excess
demand.  The weighted  average  official  price  of a Polish  made auto ln 1988  was
1.27  million  zloty.  At  the  parallel  market  exchange  rate  prevailing  in  mid-March
1989 (2900  zloty  to one  US dollar),  this  war  equal  to 434  US dollars.
Given the existence of huge excess demand at the  official prices,
allocation  schemes were developed  to ration those autos available for the
domestic  market.  These  schemes  fell  into  two  principal  categories:  (1)  a lottery
system;  and (2)  "asygnata."  In 1981,  more than 1.5  million  people  entered  the
lottery  for  the  right  to  buy  a  Polish  made  car  at  the  official  price.  The  outcome
of the lottery  was that  all  participating  individuals  received  the right  to  buy
a car in  a  certai,  ygar.  Lucky  individuals  received  the  right  to  buy  the  car  in
1981 or 1982.  Unlucky  individuals  received  later  years  throughout  the 1980m.
Individuals  paid 50 percent  of the  official  price  of the vehicle  to enter  the
lottery,  and  additional  annual  payments  so  that  the  price  was  to  be paid  by the
I8
tLme  their  delivery  date  arrived.  Inoufficient  numbers  of  care  were  allocated  to
meet  the  requirements  of  the  lottery  syotem,  however,  so  that  in  aarly  1989  there
were  about  400,000  people  waiting  for  prepaid  126ps  and  70,000  for  prepaid  FSOso
The  oecond  method  of allocating  the  care  was called  the aoygnata  system.
The  MLnistry  of Induotry  and  the  MLniatry  of Internal  Trade  decided  how  to  divide
the  care  available  for  domeatic  conaumjM.;iua..  .h'_  £ncludea  a docision  on  how  many
cars should go to the lottery  or prepayment  system. Care allocated  to the
asygnata  system  were available for allocation  as intermediate  input use in
enterprioeo and, more  significantly,  for  individuals.  Asygnatao given to
individuals  are awarded either  by Ministere (or committees  acting on theLr
behalf)  or  by directors  of  enterprises.  Asygnatao  have  generally  been  awarded  to
the  staff of  large organizations  such as  coal mines, central or  local
bureaucracies,  country  physicians,  journalists,  taxi  drivers,  handicapped  parsons
and  groups  associated  with  the  Council  of  Ministers.  The  number  of  cars  estimated
to be in  the asygnata  system  in 1988  was between  120  and 140  thousand  vehicles
out  of 177  thousand  produced  for  the  domestic  market. 8
A  final key piece of the market for domestic  cars in Poland is the
existence  of a free  market  for  cars  offered  for  resale.  Large  open  air  markets
exist  in  Warsaw  and  a few  cther  large  cities.  In  addition,  trades  occur  through
advertisements  in newspapers. 9 In this free  market,  one can buy and sell  new
or used cars,  domestic  or foreign.  In particular,  the  price  of newly  produced
domestic  autos  clears  on the  resale  free  market.  This  has  a  number  of important
implications:  (1)  any  individual  can  buy  a  domestic  vehicle  if  he is  willing  to
pay  the  market  clearing  price  for  the  domestic  vehicle;  (2)  individuals  receiving
a vehicle  at the  official  price  receive  a rent  equal  to the difference  between
the  market  clearing  price  and  the  official  price.  They  may  choose  to  sell  the  car9
and  capture  the  rent  Ln  cash  or  use  the  car  because  they  value  the  use  of  the  car
more than the  price  they  would  receive  on the free  market.  In the  latter  came,
they are consumLng  the rent.  In elther  case,  the producers  of the cars do not
receLve  the incentive  to produce  more cars  through  the  higher  price. 10
In  1989,  even  the  least  expenslve  PolLsh  auto,  the  126p,  cost  an  estimated
17.S months  of wages  for  the average  Pollsh  worker  aL  t.C offi  oRal  controlled
prLce.  At the  price  on  the free  market,  the  126p  costs  an  averags  of 63.5  months
of wages."  Thus,  the value  of the rent from  receLvLng  an allocated  auto  was
worth  approximately  46 months  of  wages.
Regarding  imported  autos,  it  was  possible  durlng  the  late  1980s  to import
these  vehicles freely, provided the  buyer could obtain *hard" currency.
organizations,  such  as  POLMOT,  would import  the  vehicles  for  a  quoted  price in
hard  currency.  The  1989  liberalizatLon  of  organizations  with  the  right  to  import,
opened  this  process  to  competLtion,  and  reduced  the  profit  margins  of  these
importing  organizatLons. 1 2 in  addition,  the  mid-March  1989  liberalization  of
the currency  exchange,  whereby  Poles  could freely  exchange  zloty  for dollars
internally  (at  parallel  market  rates),  implies  that  the  market  for  imported  autos
cleared. 13
Imolications  for  Wat;lful  Rent  Dissioation
g%or  Tlelevisions.  Full  and  exact  rent  dLssipation,  in  accordance  with  the
classic  model  by Barzol  (1974),  appears  to be the  best  way  to characterizo  the
allocation  of  domestic  color  televisions.  As  described  by  Barzel,  an indLvLdual
who is deciding  whether  to joLn the queue,  must assess  the  value  of the rent
received  versus  the  opportunity  cost  of hLs  time in  the  queue.  The full  price  to
the  buyer  Ls  the  money  price  of  the  good  plus  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  buyer's
time.  Subject  to an  uncertaLnty  premlum,  he  wlll joLn  the  end  of the  queue,  ifFigure 1.
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the  value  of the  rent exceeds  the  value  of his  time.  Than  the  queue lengthens
until the full price to the buyer (including  the opportunity  cost of time)
exactly  dissipates  the rents.  Thic implies  that  the  full  price  to the consumer
rises  to D (in  figure  1),  which  is  higher  than  the  market  clearing  price  without
a price control,  and explains  why queuing is a very inefficient  method of
allocating  rationed  goodo.
Autg.  In  autos,  however,  the  situation  is more  complicated.  First,
consider the asygnata system,  under which the majority of the autos were
allocated.  On the one hand,  many auto awards (such  as groups  favored  by the
Council  of  Ministers)  likely  fit  into  the  socially  wasteful  category  of  classical
rent dissipation  or DUP activity.  That is, awards  going to the politically
favored,  and  awards  going  to  some  professions  will  involve  lobbying  type  activity
that is socially  wasteful.  Moreover,  some of the activities  involved  may not
simply  be socially  wasteful,  but socially  counterproductive.  For example,  if
society at large values a diverse press, but the allocation  of awards to
journalists facilitates the  control of  the  press  by  non-representative
authorities,  the awards  are likely  counterproductive.  The "lobbying"  by the
journalists is  not  simply  a  waste  of  resources, but  conveys negative
externalities  on the rest  of the  economy. 14
On  the  other  hand,  in  cases  were  the  autos  were  awarded  to coal  miners  or
factory  workers  who were assessed  to be the  most productive  workers,  due  to a
second best  situation,  a socially useful  function was played by the asynata
system.  A low level  of effort  and  efficiency  is reported  in many state  owned
factories  and mines.  Competition  for  these  autos  among  factory  workers  raises
productivity  a:id  is socially  productive,  i.e., it reduces  X-inefficiency.  It
seems inappropriate,  however,  to define  the  allocation  of autos to the most12
productLve  workors  as  rent-seekLng.  Rather,  lt is  equLvalent  to  the  goverrnent
taxing  the  auto  sector  (by  requlrlng  delLvery  of  the  goods  to  the  government  at
the  controlled  price  and  reselling  them  at  the  market  clearLng  price),  and  uuing
the taxes it receLves  to pay bonus  payments  to workers.  Then the workers  are
merely  receLvLng  hLgher  wages in  accordance  wlth the value of thelr  margLnal
product;  and since the bonus payments  induces  greater  supply  of effort,  the
payments  are  not  rents. 15 Regardless  of  whether  we call  the  payments  to  workers
a bonus wage or a rent, the key point is that the Tullock rectangle  is not
socially  diL;ipated,  but  adds  to output  olsewhere  in  the  economy.
Now consLder  the lottery  system,  whLch is obviously  a method  of random
allocation  for  formlng  a  waiting  list.  The  evidence  is  that  there  was  little  one
could  do in  the  way  of  lobbying  to  alter  the  tlming  of  receLpt  of  an auto  through
the lottery  system. 16
Thus,  we  assess  that  the  lottery system caused very  llttle rent
dLssipation,  and the asygnata  system had socLally  wasteful, pernicLous  and
productive  aspects. It is impossible  to determine  which dominates,  for the
purpose  of the estimation,  we assume  that,  on balance,  there  was no socially
wasteful  rent  dissipation  from  the  price  controls  on  autos.  Since  the  judgement
involves  arbitrariness,  we  also  calculate  the  Tullock  rectangle.
XmPoKto.  Regarding  imports,  Krueger  (1974)  has noted  that quantLtative
restraLnts  on  Lmports  may  lead  to  rent  diesLpatLon  as  firms  compete  for  the  right
to  Lmport  the  rationed  good.  As  mentloned  above,  however,  there  was  no license
or  right  to  import  for  which  it  was  necessary  to  compete.  Anyone  with  the  forelgn
exchange  could  import  an  auto  or  television.  Nonethelens,  the  import  market  in
1989  was  dlstorted  by  the  aggregate  surrender  requLrement.  on  foreign  exchange;
this  was  an  implicit  tax,  however,  due  to  the  premium  on  foreign  exchange,  rather13
than a  quota  on autos. We assume,  therefore,  that  there  were  no DUP  activities
in  imported  autos  or color  televisions.
IIS.  RESULTS
Price  Decontrol
The  fLrat  policy  that  we eimulate  is  the  elimination  of  the  price  control.
The  results,  under  different  elasticity  scenarios,  are  presented  in  table  1  and
depicted  Ln flgureo  1 and 2. Curves  representing  the initial  equLlibrium  are
depicted  with superscripts  zero, and those of the new equilibrium  after  the
policy  shift are shown  with a superscript  1. If domestic  price controls  are
removed,  there  will be an expansion  of domestic  output  due to the greater
incentive  of the  higher  prices.  In  the  short  run,  output  expansion  is likely  to
be small  due  to  capacity  constraints,  but  we view  our  model  as a  long  run  model.
The greater production  of Polish vehicles and color televisions  Lncreases
welfare,  because  the  value  to  consumers  of additional  domestic  vehicles  exceeds
the  opportunity  costs  of  the  resources  to  produce  these  vehicles.  That  is,  there
is a Harberger  triangle  of benefits  equal  to the area  BCE  in figures  1 and  2.
In  the  initial  price  control  aLtuation  there  is  a  rectangle  of  rents  equal
to ABCD.  In color  televisions,  we have  argued  that  these  rents  are  dissipated,
so  that  the  value  of  this  rectangle  represents  an  additional  gain  to  society  when
price controls  are removed.  In the central  elasticity  case,  the rectangle  of
rents  equals  116 billion  zloty (about  0.4%  of Polish  GDP),  which is about 10
times  the triangle  of distortion  costs.  Moreover,  unlike  the distortion  cost
triangle  (where  the full  gains  to society  will occur  with a aignificant  lag),
since  the  queues  vanished  almost  overnight,  the  gains  from  the  rectangle  of  rants
were  achieved  very rapidly.  Thus,  the  color  television  case  is consietent  withTABLE 1
IMPACT OF ELTKMTION  OF  DOMESTIC PRICE
COTROLS  ON THE  AUT  MM  COLOR TELEVISION  NARKETS III  POLANIY
Low  Medium  High
1988 Data  Elasticities  Elasticities  Elasticities
Autos  TVs  Autos  TVs  Autos  TVs  Autos  TVs
1. Domestic Controlled Price  1.27  .394  n.a.PI n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
2. Domestic Free Price  3.54  .788  2.52  .610  2.52  .610  2.52  .610
3. Import Price (tariff inclusive)  4.26  .873  4.26  .873  4.26  .873  4.56  .873
4. Domestic Quantity  177  294  210  327  250  365  351  455
5. Import Quantity  61.6  156  43.5  135  30.7  117  15.2  87
6. Welfare Gains
i. Triangle of Distortion  37  7  82  14  200  32
ii. Rectangle of Rent Dissipations  0  116  0  116  0  116
iii. Total  37  123  82  130  200  148
7. Welfare Gains as a Percentage of GDP  .13X  .43X  .29X  .46X  .70X  .52X
8. Subsidy Equivalent to Imports due
to the price controlsg'  44X  232  43X  22X  42Z  21X
fi)  Prices  are  in  millions  of 1988  zloty,  quantities  in thousands  of autos  or color  televisions,  welfare  gains  in billions  of 1988  zloty  Ot percentage  of  1988  GDP.
n.a.  means  not applicable  in  the simulation.
51  The  rectangle  of  rents  in  autos  equals  402  million  zloty.
MI  The  rate  of  subsidy  to imports  necessary  to  reduce  imports  to  their  1988  level,  once  price  controls  are  removed.
Source:  Model  Estimates
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the view ohat,  ceterus  n*ribus,  freeing  prices  resulted  in an immediate  and
substantial  improvement  in  the standard  of llving.
In  the  case  of  autos,  the  rectangle  of  rents  equals  402  milllon  zloty  which
L8 about  5  times  the  Harberger  triangle  costs  of 82  milllon  zloty  ln  the  medium
elasticity  case.  As discuseed  above,  however,  we assess  that the rectangle  of
rents did  not represent  an additlonal  loss  to society.  Thus,  despite  the fact
that the Harberger  triangle  for autos L  about 6 times larger  than in color
televisions,  the total  benefits  from  prlce decontrol  in color  televisions  is
larger  than in autos. 17 Given  these  estimates  of rents  and the uncertainty  in
the  assessment  of theLr  diseLpation,  however,  the  reader  ie  able  to  draw  his  own
conclusions  regarding  the costliness  of the  auto  price  controls.
As important impllcation  of the model in appendix  A  is that due to
rationing of domestic autos (televLisons),  the quantity of domestic autos
(televLoLons)  is  a  parameter in  the demand functlon for  Lmported autos
(televisions).  An Lncrease  in  domestLc  output  reduces  the  demand  for  the import
substitute.  Due to the price control, any  increase  ln the production  of
domestically  produced  autos  is purchased,  the  substitution  effect  of Lncreased
domestic  autos on the demand for lmported  autos is likely  to be strong.  The
domestic  controlled  price  Ls  also  a  parameter  in  the  demand  function  for  imported
autos, and an Lncrease  in the domestic  controlled  price has the effect of
decreasing  demand  for imported  autos  through  an income  effect. 18 Thus,  when
price  controls  are  relaxed,  there  ie  a  decrease  Ln  the  demand  for  Lmported  autos
due  to the Lncrease  ln the  controlled  price,  but also  from  what L  numerically
much more important,  an Lncrease  in  domestLc  productlon.
Thus,  in  the  case  of  autos,  as  a  result  of  elLminating  the  price  controls,
imports  are  reduced  to 30.7  thousand  units,  from  61.6  thousand  units.  This  leads17
to the following  questions  What subsidy  rate to imports  would be required  to
increawe  imports  back  to their  original  level,  if  the  prLce  controls  were  not  in
effect?  We get the estimate  of 43 percent  for autos  and 22 percent  for color
televisions.1
9 That  is, without domestic prLce controls the government would
have to pay 43 percent  of the cost of imported  autos,  to induce  consumers  to
import  as  many autos  as  they  would  without  price  controls.  Any smaller  subsidy,
and  consumers  will import  fewer  autos  than in  the  original  1988  situation  after
price  controls  are eliminated.  Thus, although  the government  of Poland  has no
intention  of subsidizing  imported  autos,  the  system  of  price  controls  was  a  very
substantial  implicit  subsidy  to imports. 20
ImoRoved  F=ran  Exchanae  Polcy 
The econd  policy  change  we simulate  is an improvement  in the exchange
rate  policy,  with price  controls  remaining  in  place.  The results  are  presented
in  table  2  and  depicted  in  figures  3  and  4.  The  parallel  market  exchange  rate  (as
of  March  1989  it  was  2900  zloty  to  one  US  dollar)  was  itself  distorted  (too  high)
due  to the surrender  requirements  (at  the  official  grossly  overvalued  exchange
rate)  imposed  on  exporters  for  about  70  percent  of  their  foreign  exchange
earnings.  Tarr  (1990a)  has  estimated  the  ehadow  foreign  exchange  rate  at  about
63  percent  of  the  parallel  market  exchange  rate  (more  than  3  times  greater  than
the  official  exchange  rate),  where  it  was  the  parallel  market  exchange  rate  that
represented  the  cost  of  foreign  exchange  for  individuals. 2 1 The  opportunity
cost  of imports  to  Poland  were  more  properly  valued  at  this  shadow  exchange  rate.
At the parallel  exchange rate, individuals  were discouraged  from consuming
imported  autos.  If aggregate  policies  were changed (ouch  as a devaluation  as
occurred  in  1990  or  reducing  the  surrender  requirements  of  exporters)  providing
greater  incentive  to  exports  and  thereby  inducing  a  lower  exchange  rate  equal  toTABLE  2
INPACT  OF ELININATING NACROECMONMIC  FOREIGN  EXCHNAGE
RESTRICTIONS  ON THE AUTO  AND  COLOR  TELEVISION  MARKETS  IN POLAND  a/
Lou  Nedium  High
1988  Data  Elasticities  Elasticities  Elasticities
----  ---  --  ---  ---  ---  ...  . . ....  . --  - - - - - -
Autos  TVs  Autos  TVs  Autos  TVs  Autos  TVs
1. Domestic  Controlled  Price  1.27  .394  1.27  .394  1.27  .394  1.27  394
2.  Domestic  Free  Price  3.54  .788  3.09  .705  3.00  .634  2.96  602
3.  Import  Price  (tariff  inclusive)  4.26  .873  2.67  .548  2.67  .548  2.67  548
4.  Domestic  Quantity  177  294  177  294  177  294  177  294
5.  Import  Quantity  61.6  156  77.8  197  98.2  249  156.6  397
6.  Welfare  Gains
i.  Triangle  of  Distortion  13  7  29.0  15  75  39
ii.  Rectangle  of  Rent  Dissipation  0  24  0  45  0  55
iii.  Total  13  31  29  60  75  94
7.  Welfare  Gains  as  a  Percentage  of  GDP  .05X  .11X  .10X  .21X  .27X  .33X
. ...  ...  ....  ...  ....  .....  .........  ........
a/  Prices  are  in  millions  of  1988 zloty.  quantities  in  thousands  of  autos  or  cotor  televisions,  welfare  gains  in  biLlions  of  1988
zloty  or  percentage  of  1988 estimated  GDP.
Source:  Model  EstimatesFiure  3.
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the shadow  exchange  rate,  individuals  would  import  mote,  generating  consumption
efficiency  gains. 2 2
The  decrease  in  the  price  of  imports  reduces  the  demand  for  domestic  autos,
because  the  goods  are  gross  substitutes.  The  decrease  in  the  demand  for  domestic
autos,  results  in  a  decroase  in  the  price  of  autos  on  the  free  resale  market  for
autos.  Consequently,  there  is a  reduction  in rento  of domestic  autos.  There  is
no feedback  effect  on the price of imported  autos, however,  because,  under
rationing  of domestic  autos,  the  demand  for  imported  autos  depends  on  the  market
for  domestic  autos  only  through  the  controlled  price  in  the  domestic  market  and
the  quantity  of  domestic  autos  produced  (see  equation  3  of  the  appendix),  neither
of which  have  changed.
in  both  autos  and  televisions,  the  improved  foreign  exchange  policy  reaults
in a triangle  of  benefits  in  the  import  market,  which is shaded  in panel  B  of
figures  3  and  41  this  is  a  traditional  Harberger  type  triangle  where  the  marginal
valuation  of imports  by consumers  exceeds  the marginal  coats  to society.  In
addition,  whether  or not  there is rent  dissipation  has a strong  effect  on the
welfare  results  through  second  best  effects.  Since  import  liberalization  reduces
the  demand  for  the  domestic  substLtute,  Lt  reduces  the  rent  on  domestlc  autos  and
color  televLLons to the  smaller  rectangle  ABC'D';  thus,  the  reduction  Ln  rents
Ls  equal  to  the  rectangle  DD'C'C.  In  color  televisions  thLe  should  reduce  queuing
time,  and  therefore  constitutes  an  additional  benefit  of import  liberalization.
This L  a second  best type benefit  from the foreLgn  exchange  liberallzation,
since lt would not be a  gaLn without the exlitence of the prLce control
dietortLon  ln the domestic  market.  In the caoe of autos,  where  we have argued
that  the  rents  are  not  dLssipated,  there  Ls  no second  best  welfare  effect  in  the
domestic  market.22
In the central  elasticity  case,  the second  best bensflts  of reduced  rent
dLesipation  ln  domestLc  color  televiLions  (of  45  billlon  zloty)  are  3  times  the
direct  dLtortion costs  in  the  import  market.  Because  there  are  no  benefits  from
reduced rent diLsipatLon  Ln autos, the total benefits  of forelgn exchan;.
liberallzation  in color televLsions  (0.21%  of GDP) are about twlce those of
autoe.
Regarding  the  effect  of  the  elasvicities,  as  the  demand  curve  for  imports
becomes  more elastic,  Lt la evldent  from flgures  3 and  4 that the trLangle  of
estLmated  distortion  costs Lncreases.  Cross  elastLcLtLes  also lncrease  ln the
high  elasticLty  case.  Then in response  to the  decline  ln the  price  of Lmported
autos,  the  demand  for  domestLc  autos  on the  free  market  shlfte  in  by  more  in  the
high elasticity  case. This Lmplles  a greater reductlon  in rent and greater
benefits  from reduced  rent dissLpatLon.  The trLangle  of dietortLon,  however,
becomes  a larger  share  of the  total  benefits  as elasticLtLes  lncrease,  in  part
because  the  rectangle  of  reduced  rent  disLspatLon  is  llmited  by  the  finLte  amount
of rent  dissipatlon  ln the  initlal  equLlibrLum. 2323
APPENDIX A
THE MODEL FOR AUTOS AND COLOR TVa
Quality differences between Polish autos and imported (especially  from the
West)  are  considered  quite  significant  such that  a differentiated  model  is
necessary.24 The essential feature of the Polish domestic auto market is that
it is in shortage.
Regardless  of the price on the  gfee resale market  for domestic autos,
aggregate production and consequently consumption of domestic autos is fixed
(unless the official price changes). Withln the range of the releveant  policy
experiments to be consLdered, whatever is produced and offered at the official
controlled price (whlch  we denote  by Pc) wlll be  purchased by  domestLc consumers.
Let there be three goods: domestLc autos (Q), Lmported autos  (q) and a
composite of other goods  (X).  Assume that the consumer  is a  representative
consumer and  wishes to maximize utility u(Q, q,  X), subject to income and  prices.
Our objectlve  of thli representatlve consumer model  is to derlve the demand
functLon for imported autos. Clearly the representative consumer model is not
suLtable for derLvLng the demand function for domestic autos on the free  market,
since that Lnvolves dLfferLng valuatLons of a domestLc auto among consumers. We
relax the representative consumer assumptlon below in  order to derive the demand
functlon for domestLc autos on the free market.
Slnce  the  consumer  is  representative,  he  is  assumed  to  receLve  a
proportionate share of total autos allocated. Let Q - Q' denote the flxed amount
of domestLc  autos allocated to the consumer.  There  Le  a  resale market  for24
domeatic autos,  wh:.ch  clears,  but sales on this  market do not affect the  quantity
of domestic autos consumed, which  is fixed at nQ' (where n is the number of
consumers). Sales on the resale market only represent income transfers among
consumers. Moreover,  since they are only transfers, they do not affect total
income available to %I_ consumers for  purchase of the other goods, q or X. Thus,
for the purpose of deriving the aggregate demand function for auto imports, we
may ignore the resale market. The consumer consumes his fixed allocation of Q
Q', for which he pays PC  and his problem is reduced to:
(1)  max u(Q', q, X)  S.T. Y =  PCQ' +  p'q +  PXX.
where Y - income, Px =  the price of X, p' =  the tariff inclusive  price of q, and
the other variables  have been defined above.
Define U(q, X; Q') =  ufQ', q, X)
and Y' - Y - PCQ *
U  is utility as a  function of q, and X with Q' as a  parameter; and Y' is
residual income available for purchase of q and X after the consumer purchases
Q' at the controlled price.
Then the  consumer's utility  maximization problem  may be further  reduced  to:
(2)  max  U(q,  X; Q')  S.T. Y' =  p'q +  PxX
From 2, maximization of U subject to Y' yields that the consumer's demand
function for q is:
(3)  q - dplp' Px.°  Y'(Pc,Q'), Q'l
where  the  parameters  on  which  residual  income depend  have  been  explicitly
incorporated. Note that the  demand function  depends on  both Pc and  the additional
parameter Q'. Both Pc and Q' have an effect on the demand for q through their
impact  on Y'. In addition, because  the utility function  depends  on the additional
parameter Q', it is included separately as a parameter.2525
Define the free market price of domestic autos on the resale market an P.
Note that P is not lncluded in the demand function for imported autos. ThLi in
because P has no effect on the amount of domestle autos consumed, due to the
shortage,  i.e., there  is  no  substitution  effectl  and  a  change  in P  hao  a
redistributive effect among consumers, but does not affect aggregate residual
income available of all consumers for the purchase of q or X, i.e., there is no
aggregate income effect of a change in the free market price.
That is we can completely characterize the aggregate quantity demanded of
domestic autos (nQ'), imported autos (from equation 3) and the composite other
good  (an equation of the same form as 3) without reference to the free market
price P.  This result derives from the fact  that  we are conceiving of our colsumer
as representative, who  consumes his allocated share of autos. Below we shall
explain the demand function for  domestic autos on the free  market, and will have
to depart from the representative consumer model; but that departure will not
affect the demand  curve for imported autos or the composite good, since, as
explained above, sales  among consumers of  domestic autos  are  only rent  transfers.
Finally, before reaching the functional form implemented in  the model, we
invoke a standard assumption in applied microeconomic modelling. We assume that
utility is  weakly separable between aggregate  auto consumption and the composite
good X. This implies that the demand functions for domestic and imported autos
may be formulated without explicit reference to the price of the composite good
X. The price of the composite good will affect demand for  autos only through its
impact on the  income allocated to  agsregate auto consumption.  Since we are
conducting comparative statics  experiments, we assume that the impact of income
and other variables are incorporated into the constant of the demand function,26
and for our eampirLeal  applications  we adopt the following functional  form
representations
({)  ln(q)  * a  +  b ln(Pc)  +  c In (p(l+t))  +  a  ln(Q)  (Demand  for
imported  autos)
where t ia  the  tariff  rate,  so  that p - p'/(l+t)  La  the  tariff  exclusLve  price
of imported  autos.
Th  JDeand  FunctiQn  for  Domestic  Amtoo
As indicated  above,  the  controlled  prLce  of  domestic  autos  li  so  low,  that
the aggregate  amount  offered  by domestic  firms  will be purchased.  That is,  for
changes  in  the  controlled  price  of  domestic  autos  whlch  are  below  the  free  market
price,  the  quantlty  demanded  of  domestic  autos  will  not  change  becauae-the  price
that  affects  the  quantity  demanded  of domestic  autos  at the  margin  is  the free
market  price.
For  some  purposes,  however,  it  i1  necessary  to  know  the  Marshallian  market
demand  curve  for  domestic  autos  if  the  quantity  allocated  of domestic  autos  were
not fixed.  This  would  allow  aseessment  of rent  transfers  among  consumers,  and,
more importantly,  determine  new equilLbrium  prices  and  welfare  effects  in the
event  of price  decontrol.  Moreover,  analogous  to the  concern  of Charemza  et al.
it  would  allow  computation  of the  amount  of excess  demand.
Suppose  then  that  there  is no price  control  and  the  quantity  of domestic
autos available to the consumer  is  a variable over which he can optimize. Then
the form  of the  Marshallian  demand  function  for  domestic  autos  Ls  standards
(4) Q =  D(P, P ,  PxJ  Y)
If we depart from the assumptLon  that all consumers  receive  a proportionate
allocatLon  of autos,  equatLon  (4)  would  also  explaLn  the  demand  for  autos  under
prlce  control.  The  key  change  is  that  if  the  consumer  has  receLved  an offLically27
allocated  auto 9 he incurs  an  opportunity  cost  of P if  he decLdes  to consume  Lt.
That is,  we conceive  of hs  Lneome  boLng  augmented  by the  rental  value  of the
auto  on  the  resale  market,  and  he decLds to consume  an auto  or  not  accordLng  to
ordinary  utliLty  maximizatLon  subject  to  augment.d  income.  Consumers  who  do  not
recoive  an  allocated  auto  would  have  a  demand  functLon  of  the  same form  am (4)
except  that  lncome  i  not  augmented  by  the  rental  value  of  the  auto.  The
aggregation  of  LndLvLdual  demand  curves  yields  the  market  demand  curve  for
domestic  autos  on  the  free  market  of  the  form  of  equatLon  (4).
AgaLn  uslng the weak separabliLty  assumptLon,  the prlce of Px l  not
expllcLtly  lncorporated  and  lncome  effects  are  lncorporated  ln the  constant  of
the  equation,  yLoldLng  the  form  employed  ln the  empirLcal  work:
(1X)  ln  Q - A  +  B  in  P  *  C  In  p(t*1).
As mentLoned  above,  Neary  and  Roberts  (1980)  have  developed  the  tochnlque
of Ovirtual"  prices  that  would  allow  the  estimation  of  the  prlce  that  would  clear
the  market  for  domeotic  Pollsh  autos,  provlded  the  form  of the  demand  functlon,
the  inLtLal  quantlty  and  controlled  prLce  are  known.  Fortunately,  however,  we
have  directly  observable  data  from  the  resale  open  alr  market  for  domestic  autos
for  the  price  of  domestLc  autos  that  clears  the  resale  market.  An lndlvldual  who
receives  no initLal  allocatLon  of domestlc  autos  can go to these  markets  and
purchase  as  many  new  domestie  autos  as  he  likes  at the  free  market prlce.
IndLvLduals  who decide  to  consume  their  allocated  autos,  pay  an  opportunlty  cost
equal  to  the  free  market  price.  Thus,  lt L  posslble  to  obtaln  observatLons  of
a  polnt  on  the  demand  curve  11,  sLnce  the  free  market  prlce  Ls  the  prlce  at  which
the  ?arshaliLan  demand  curve  clears  for  the  number  of  auios  produced,  glven  other
parameters  ln  the economy  affectLng  demand. 2628
With  the  demand  curve  11,  it will  be  poselble  to  determine  the  value  to
consumers  of  addltlonal  unlts  of Q  derivLng  from  an  easing  or  termlnation  of
domestLc  price  controls.  EquatLon  3  will  continue  to  be employed  for  the  demand
function  of imported  autos  in  the  price  decontrol  experiment.  one can  think  of
a sequential  eaeLng  of price  controls,  approachLng  full  price  decontrol,  where
the  rationale  for  equation  I  holds  at any  partLcular  controlled  price  and  fixed
quantlty. ConceLving of the problem in this manner avoids the problem of
calibratlng  a  new  demand  function  for  lmported  autos (which  would  depend  on the
free  market  price  of domestLc  autos)  for  which  there  is  no observed  data.
Eauaionsof  thea  Simulation  Model
The model  is characterized by equations  I-XV. Domestic  variables  are
denoted  by  uppercase  lettera  and  imported  varLables  are  denoted  by  lower  case
letters.
(I)  ln(q)  a  a  +  b  ln(Pc)  +  c  ln  [p(l+t)J  +  a  ln(Q)  (Demand  for
imported  autos)
(IT)  ln(Q)  - A  +  B  ln(P)  +  C  ln(p(l+t)j  (Demand  for domestic
autos on the  free  market)
(II')  Pc  =  Pc  (The  domestic controlled price is fixed)
(III) ln(Q) - D +  E ln(Pc)  (Supply  of domestic autos)
(IV)  p(l+t)  - k  (Supply price of imported autos,
tarLff inclusive)
Equation  I  and II  are the  demand functLons  for imported  and domestic autos,
respectively  which  have  been  diecussed.  Equation  II'  states that the controlled
price  is  fixed  at  Pc  It  is  this  equation that applies  Ln the flrst polLcy
experiment,  where  prlce  controls  are  maintained,  and  the  lmport  regime  is
lLberallzed.  When  price  controls  are  removed,  equation  II  replaces  equatLon  111.29
In the first  policy  experiment,  however,  equation  2X io used to estimate  the
value  of the rent from receiving  an allocated  auto,  and the amount  of excess
demand.
Equation  III  is  the  supply  function  for  domestic  autos.  Auto  producers  are
assumed  to face  increasing  marginal  costs  of  production.  To increase  production
would  require  more  labor,  for  example.  In  order  to attract  additional  workers  to
an  auto  company requires paying higher wages, because there  is  little
unemployment  in  Poland.  Increasing  marginal  costs  implies  that  the  supply  curve
is  upsloping; 27 and  it  depends  on the  price  received  by the  firms,  which  is  the
controlled  or official  price.  In addition,  however,  Poland  is  an  economy  facing
generalized  shortages.  As a result,  some inputs  into auto  production  will be
fixed  or close  to fixed.  It follows  from  the  well-known  LeChatelier  Principle,
that  the  more inputs  are  in  flxed  supply,  the  more  inelastlc  is  the  supply  curve
of the firm.  Thus,  we shall  assume  a very low  elasticity  of supply  by Western
standards,  and  simulate  the results  over  a  range  of elasticities.
In equation  IV,  we adopt  the small country  assumption,  and assume  that
imports  of  autos  are  supplied  to Poland  at a delivered  price,  in  dollars,  that
Poland  cannot  influence.  Poland  does,  however,  have  the  abillty  to  impose  tariffs
and  influence  its  exchange  rate,  so  that  the  prlce  to  consumers  of  imported  autos
in zloty can be altered.
Cross-Elasticities  In theD  amand  for ImDorted Autos
From 3, one can obtain  and interpret  appropriate  values  for the cross-
elasticities  of equation (I).  First consider  the elasticity  of demand for
imported  autos with respect  to a  change  in the controlled  price  of domestic
autos. Taking  partial  derivatives  from  3:
a8 a  &
apc  ay'  ape30
From  the defiLntion  of Y's
?J  . _  Q'
ape
Thus b, of equation  (I),  can  be expressed  as
b= fc  ig - lc 2g, (-Q')
q  aPc  q  aY
Define  the income  elasticity  of imported  autos  as
e - ia 
aY'  q
Then  rearranging  yieldst
b - e  ' - SQ  *  e
y
where  SQ  - EcQ' is  the share  of reiLdual  income  spent  on
Ye
domestic  autos.  That is,  the  cross  elasticity  of import  demand  with  respect  to
the price  of  domestic  autos,  reduces  to the  share  of residual  income  spent  on
domestic  autos  times  the  income  elastLeity  of  demand  for  $mported  autos.  Based
on  the  eatlmates  of  Charemza,  Gronicki  and  Quandt  (1988)  who  estimate  small
values  for  the  income  elasticity  of  demand  for  Polish  autos,  the  value  of  e  - .5
is  assumed;  then  given  data on SQ,  b - - .02.28
Note that, although  small  the value of b is negative.  This contrasts
sharply  with models that are equilibrLum  models.  Here the increase  in the
controlled  price of domestLc  autos does not induce  an decrease in domestic
quantity  demanded,  so  there  is  no substitution  effect. There  is  only  an income
effect  of  the  domestic  price  increase,  which  reduces  demand  for  all  normal  goods,
including  imported  autos.
Now  consider  s,  the  elasticity  of dem4nd  for  imported  autos  with respect
to  the  quantity  of  domestic  autos.  Differentiate  3  with  respect  to a  change  in31
the amount of domestic autos allocated. The change in demand for imported autos
is:
(6)  jg - OaY' +  g.
aQ,  8Y'Q'  BQ'  (residual income conotant)
6 decompooes the change in the demand for  imported autos when the quantity of
domeatic autos changes into two componuu&La.  thc f'-t  term  i  the income effect
on purchases of imported autos  when an additional  unit of domestic autos becomes
available; and the second term is the substitution effect. This equatlon  is
analogous to the Slutsky equation and to equation 21 in Neary-Roberts.
Since  Y' =  -PC  ,  we have that
BQf
AO  A  fg  (-Pe)-
BY'  BQ'  dY'
Now consider the second term g.
8Q'
First suppose that the goods are perfect substitutes. Then a one unit increase
in the  quantity  of  domestic  autos  available would,  absent  income effects,
decrease the purchase of imported autos by exactly one unit. That is
-g  -1.
aQ'
If the goods are not perfect substitutes, a one unit increase in domestic autos
will induce less than one unit decrease in imported autos, say -v, where 0 <  v
< 1,  is  a  product differentiation parameter,  where smaller values imply  the goods
are less  perfect substitutes. v is assumed, in  this study to take the value .7.
Combining these results yieldst
- -g  (- Pc)  - v.
dQ'  BY'
Multiplying both sides by Q'/q and the first  term by one in the form of qY'/qYT,
yields the elasticity s:32
*F  s  - ^g  e  - 8Q  *  a  v Q  /q
q  *iQ'
The first  term (- SQ *  e) in the elasticity  of import  auto demand  with
respect  to the supply  of domestic  autos,  a, is identical  to the elasticity  of
import  auto  demand  with  respect  to  the  domestic  controlled  price.  This  is  because
it  is  the  income  effeet  of the  change  in  quantity  and  it  affects  residual  income
in  a symmetric  manner  to  the  price  of domestic  autos.  What is  of  more  practical
importance,  is that the second  term (v  Q'/q)  numerically  dominates  the first.
Thus,  when  we  conelder  the  simulation  of  decontrol  of  domestic  prices,  the  demand
for  imports  decreases;  this  L  because  the  increase  in  the  demand  for  imports  due
to the increase  in  P., is  considerably  less  than  the  decrease  in  the  demand  for
imports  due  to the increase  in  Q'.
The  Cross-Elasticity  in  the Demand  for  Domestic  Autos
Finally,  we require the value C, the cross-elasticity  of demand for
domestic  autos  with  respect  to the  price  of imported  autos. As  mentioned  above,
we assume  the  consumer's  utility  function  for  autos  (imported  and domestic)  is
-weakly  separable"  from  all  other  goods. Tarr (1990c)  has  shown  that based  on
weakly separable  utility  a  "modified  Cournot  aggregation  condition"  applies,
which ln  this context  reduces  to:
(7)  SQ'*C  + Sq*c  +  Sq-  XA  P-
ap* YA
where Sq - g'g  SQ' - 2Q'
YA  YA
YA - income  allocated  to autos,  and  C and  c are from  equations  I  and  II.
The  shares  are  known  data  and  we have  an  estimate  of the  own  elasticity  of
demand. The term on the right of 7 is the elasticity  of demand of income
allocated  to  aggregate  auto  consumption  with  respect  to a  change  in  the  price  of
imported  autos.  It  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  a  change  in  the  price  of  imported33
autos  ham only  a  small  impact  on  the  income  allocated  to  autos;  we  take thlc
value  to  be .25.  We thus  solve  7  for  c  - .35  in  the  case  of  autos  and  C  - .40
for  color  TVo.
In  the case  of autos,  estimates  of  the  own  price  and  income  elasticities
are  obtained  from  the  econometric  study  of  the  Polish  auto  market  by  Charemaa,
oronicki  and  Quandt  (1988).  Their  broad  conclusion  is  that  the  price  elasticities
of  demand  are  high  (usually  greater  than  unity),  but  the income  elasticity  is
low.  Thus,  in  the  central  elasticity  case,  we take  the  own  elasticities  (3  and
c) to be equal to -1 and the Lncome elasticity to be equal to .5. The income
elasticity  is  used  in the appendix to estimate the cross-elasticities. These
values ares C - .35t  b  - -.01; and a  a  -2.0. In the central elasticity case, we
assume the elasticity  of  supply with  respect to the price  received by auto
producers is .5.  The high and low elasticity estimates are obtained by doubling
and halving all elasticity estimates, respectively.29
The model was calibrated to 1988 data. Based on the above, all parameters
of equations I-IV are  known except a,  a  and  D. Thus, we obtain data on the values
of Q, q, P,  Pc, and p(l+t) for 1988 and assume that these values are a  solutLon
to our system of equations I-IV.  The details  of obtaining the data are discussed
in  the  appendix  B.  Given  the  above  values  of  the  elasticities,  thli  allows  us  to
solve  for  the  constants  A,  D and  a.  Note  that  the  observed  values  of  Q and  P  in
1988  are  on  the  demand  curve  II,  but  there  is  a  shortage  in  the  market  for
domestic  autos  at  the  controlled  price.  Thus,  we have  calibrated  the  model  out
of  equilibrium.  30
APPENDIX  B
DATA SOURCES IN  AUTOS AND COLOR  TVS 3134
Xn this appendix  we deocribe  the sources  of the  data  which  we  used  in the
models  of  the  text.  Most  of  the  data  was  obtaLned  from  the  Polish  government'l
Central  Statistical  Office  (CSO)  in  Warsaw.  since  we desired  to  have  the  moot
recent  tim.i  period  as  possible,  we  obtained  printouts  available  in  the  Central
StatistLial  Office. Eventually  these data will be published in official
sourcea,  but were not publiahed  at the time this study  was written.  Import
data  relating  to imports  for  personal  consumption,  called  "private  imports,"
were  taken  from  printouts  of  the  Customs  Administration.  CSO  printout  data  are
subject to revision, but the revision  is expected  to be  small. Unless
otherwise specified,  CSO printouts  are our source.  Recent  changes in the
classification  of these  data,  has  made  them all  publicly  available.
AUTOS
There were 38,700 FSOS produced  in 1988; 206,448 126pm;  and 48,300
Poleneze  for  total  domestic  production  of  293,448.  The  quantity  of  exports  was
116,049,  yielding  177,399  thousand  autos  produced  for  the  domestic  market.  We
take  this latter  number  as  Q  in our  model.  There  were 61.6  thousand  imported
autos  in  1988,  which  is  our value  for  q.
For the domestic  free  price of domestic  autos  P, we used the weekly
magazine  Zvcie o2gRodaroze.  This  weekly  magazine  publishes  the  prices  of  autos
in the open air  markets (although  not all vehicles  prices  are published  in
every  issue). We first  took  an  average  of the  pricee  published  there  for  the
year for three vehicles: 126p, FSO (1300)  and Polenez.  This average  was
arrived  at  by first  averaging  the  available  published  data  for  these  vehicles
within  each  month  to obtain  an  observation  for  each vehicle  for  each  month.
Then the 12  monthly  observations  were averaged  for  each  vehicle  separately.
These  annual  average  prices  were  then  weighted  by  the  shares  of  these  vehicles
in  total  production,  based  on the  data in  the  previous  paragraph.35
The  controlled  price  of  the  Polonez  in  July 1988  was  2.5  million  zlotyp
Lt was 1.9 million zloty for the PSO 1500. For the 126p we eatimate  the
offLeLal  prLce at  .845  milllon zloty as an average  of the prices between
December 1987 and December 1988.32  The weighted average prle¢ is  1.27
million  zloty.
To obtain  the  relevant  prlie  of imports  it is necessary  to make a few
adjustments.  The  value  of imports  are  reported  in  official  statistics  at the
official  exchange  rate.  The average  official  exchange  rate in 1988  was 434
zloty per dollar.  Thus, the value of an imported  $7,000  Toyota  wlll be
reported  as S7,000*434  zloty.  Imports  generally  must  be paid for  in  dollars;
thus lt is the parallel  market  exchange  rate that is relevant.  The average
parallel  market exchange  rate in 1988  was 1979 zloty  per dollar,  or 4.555
times  the average  official  exchange  rate.
The average  unit  value  of an imported  vehicle  was .904  million  zloty,
which  we multiply  by 4.55 to obtain  4.12  mLlLon  zlot,  as the average  unlt
value at the parallel  market  exchange  rate.  Finally,  we add 3 percent for
transportation,  and  markups,  yielding  4.24  million  zloty  for  our  estimate  of
p.
The tariff  rate  on CHEA imports  L  0 (CMEA  Lmports  are  about  one-third
of total  imports),  and  on non-CMEA  imports  lt is  3.7  percent. 33 TarLffs  are
paid in zloty  on the  Lmports  valued  at  the  offlcial  exchange  rate.  Thus,  the
average  tariff  rate  is less  than one  percent  when the imports  are  valued  at
the parallel  market  exchange  rate.
COLOR  TVs36
The  quantity  of  domestic  production  Q was  293,500  unLtag  thli  was  taken
from  _t  tatvmtvagn Nol/1989,  a  monthly  bulletin  of  the  CSO,  but  also
chocked  with  the  CSO prlntouts.  The  quantity  of  Lmports  was 156,136  units.
The  average  retaLl  price  P.  for  a Pollsh  TV  was 394,000  zloty.  The  free
market  price  was  approximately  twice  the  controlled  prlce.  The latter  price
is obtained  through  checking  newspaper  quotes  and interviews.
Regarding the price  of  imports,  these data  are unavaLlable  through
offiLcal  foreign  trade  aggregate  statistics.  Through  Lntervlews  at the CSO,
we found  that  the  average  price  of all  color  TVs  sold  ln  Poland,  both  foreign
and  domestlc,  i  323,000  zloty,  where  the imports  are  valued  at  the  official
exchange  rate.  Then lf  A a  the  amount  spent  on all  TVs,  where  the  imports  are
valued  at the  offiLcal  exchange  rate,  A - 323,000  zloty  *  449,636.  If  B  the
amount  spent  on domestic  color  TVs,  B - 293,500  *  394,000  zloty.  Then  A - B
ia the amount  spent  on imported  color  TVs valued  at the official  exchange
rate,  and (A  - 8)/156,136  - the  average  price  of an imported  color  TV valued
at the official  exchange  rate.  Following  the discuseLon  for autos,  we must
multiply  this  value  by  4.55  to  obtaln  the  average  price  of  imported  TVs  at  the
parallel  market  exchange  rate,  which  is the  relevant  price  for  the  consumer.
This value  is 863,867  zloty.
The tariff  rate  on  imports  from  the  West L  1.3  percent,  and  0  on  CMEA
imports.  The  weLghted  average  tariff  rate  ia  1.1  percent,  which  ylelds  873,450
as the  average  tariff  LncluaLve  price  of  import.,  p(l+t)  ln  our  equatLons.
APPENDIX  C
THE  LITERATURE  ON ALLOCATION  OF RATIONED  GOODS  AND RENT  DISSIPATION37
We note at the outset the dLitLnctLon made by Browning (1974) between
rent creatlon  (which is the paosage of a law that makes rent possible) and
rent allocatLon, whlch ia the dlviLion of the rent once created. Rents may  be
disLopated in  the  process of persuadLng the authoritLes to create the rent,
or Ln  allocating the rent. Bhagwati  has  made a simLlar  dietLnctLon between DUP
activities that are distortion seeking and distortion triggered. It iL rent
allocatlon  (or dLotortion  triggered  activLties) that  ia  important in the
context of the price controls in Poland, and lt the focus of our analysis.
In panel A  of figure  1, we have  the graph of  a market  under price
control. The price to the domestic consumer li not legally permitted to rise
above A. At this price, firms are willing to supply the amount AB. For the
quantity AB, the price D is the market clearing price, where the marginal
valuation to consumers, D, exceeds the marginal costs to society of producing
the product, A.  RemovLng the price control  will increase  the quantity supplied
and demanded  until  at E,  the marginal  valuation  of  consumers equals  the
marginal cost of producing the product. The area DCE represents the triangle
of traditional "Harberger" distortion costs whlch are avoLded  by  removing  the
price control.
Tullock (1967)  noted that the rectangle ABCD may also represent a loss
to  socLety,  ao  that  the  costs of  the  prlce control  will  exceed  BCE.  In
particular, when the good is under price control, there is excess demand for
the good at price A. and the allocation of a unit of the good conveys a rent
to the reclpient equal to D-A. Indivlduals may then expend resources Ln an
oeffort  to obtain the good. The expenditure of these resources in an effort to
obtain the good will reduce the rent  of the recipient, l.e., lt will dissipate
the rents. The classic way ln  which allocated rents from price control may be38
dLisLpated  was  developed  ln  a  model  by Barzol  (1974).  IndLvLduals  form  a  queue
for  the  product.  An LndLvidual  who is  declding  whether  to joLn  the  queue,  must
assess  the  value  of  the  rent  received  verous  the  opportunity  cost  of  hli  tLme
in  the  queue.  The  full  price  to the  buyer  is  the  money  price  of the  good  plus
the opportunity  coat  of the  buyer's  tLme.  Subject  to an uncertainty  premlum,
he  will joLn  the  end  of the  queue,  if  the  value  of the  rent  exceeds  the  value
of hLs time.  Then the queue lengthens  until  the full price  to the buyer
(includlng  the opportunity  cost  of tLme)  exactly  dieeipates  the  rents.  This
implies  that the  full  price  to  the consumer  rLeas  to D,  which  is  higher  than
the  market  clearing  price  wlthout  a prlce  control,  and  explalns  why queuing
is a very LneffLicent  method  of allocating  rationed  goods.
Lindsay and Feigenbaum  (19Q4)  have developed  another  model in which
allocated  rents  are  completely  dLssLpated,  even  when individuals  do  not  waste
time  queuing  for  the  good,  but  where  goods  are  allocated  according  to  waiting
liats. The central assumption  of their model is that they limit theLr
diecussion  to products  in  which  delay in the  receLpt  of the  product  reduces
its value. For example,  receivLng  a vacation  at a  Black Sea resort, or
obtaining  an article  of fashionable  clothing  will be reduced ln value if
received  at a late  or Lnopportune  time. In such  cases,  there  is a  length  of
the waLting lLt  beyond  which one will not join,  because  at the time the
consumer  expects  receLpt  of  the  product  her  valuation  is reduced  to  the  poLnt
where  there is  no rent.
The early literature  on rent-seeking (for example,  Tullock, 1967;
Krueger,  i974;  Posner,  1975)  focused  on cases in which  rents  are fully  and
exactly  diseLpated. 34 During  the 1980s,  however,  a  number  of models  were
developed  that showed  conditions  under  which  rent  dLssLpation  may  exceed  or39
be less  than  actual  rents.  Deacon  and  Sonstelie  (1989)  modified  the  model  of
Barzel  to allow  for  the  possibility  of  various  technologies  that  would  reduce
the cost of queuing,  and showed  that overdisoipation  of the rents will
generally  occur  in these  circumetances. 35
V-.
There  has  been  more discusoion  of the  $*ssibility  of underdissipation
of the  rents.  Hillman  and  Katz (1984)  showed  that in  a Barzel  type  model  with
uncertainty  of receipt  of the  rationed  good,  risk  aversion  would  induce  loes
than full rent dissipation.  The risk aversion  effect  would be larger,  the
larger  the costs  of waiting  in relation  to the  wealth  of the individual. 36
Flowers  (1987)  has  noted  various  methods  of avoiding  rent dissipation
in  rent  allocation  schemes.  Most notably,  if  the  rationed  good is  auctioned,
then  the total  costs  of the  price  control  is the  Harberger  triangle,  except
for  minor  administrative  costs  of  the  auction. 37 In  addition, the
allocation  of rents  by random  methods  will  generally  avoid  the  dissipation  of
rents.
Bhagwati  and  Srinivasan  (1980) and  Bhagwati  (1980;  1982) have
established  the  striking  result  that  due  to  second  best  considerations,  there
are conditions  under which DUP activitLea  nay be welfare improving.  For
example,  consider  an economy  which  produces  two  goods,  goods 1 and 2,  where
a tariff  of 50 percent  is imposed  on good 2. Consider  two casess (l) the
tariff  is  imposed  exogenously  without  any  lolb$ing  activity;  and (Li)  "tariff
seekers"  in Lndustry  2 expend  resources  in lobbying  activity  that contracts
the  economy's prcduction possibility frontier for  the  two  goods, but
ultimately  achieves  the same  50  percent  tariff.  7he  presumption  of the rent-
seeking  literature  was that  case (ll)  is welfare  inferior  to case (i) (see
Tullock,  1981).  Due  to  the  tariff  on  good  2,  however,  in  case (i)  the  economy40
produces  too  much  of  good 2 and too little  of good 1 for  a eoclal  optimu.
Anything  that  shifts  resources  toward  the  production  of  good  1  wlll  be  welfare
improving,  eterus  nAribuLs.  In particular,  if lobbying  shifts  productLon
toward  good  1,  there  will  be a  welfare  tradeoff  between  the  lose  of  resources
expended  in  lobbying,  and  the oecond  best  benefit  of  reducing  the  distortLon
of  too  lttle  it,f nMnd  I hoina  nroduced.  In these  conditLons,  BhagwatL  shows
that  up to a  certain  amount  of lobbying,  lobbying  is  welfare  superior  to the
impositLon  of the  tariff  exogenouely. 38 Since  DUP activities  can  be welfare
Lmproving,  this  led  Bhagwati  to  emphaeize  the  need  for  empirLcal  estLmates  ln
specifLc  situations.
In Eastern  Europe  another  kind  of second  best  situation  has  existed  I.n
which  the  allocation  of  goods  at  below  market  prlces  may  be  welfare  enhancing.
A  low  level  of offort  and  efficiency  ie  reported  in  many  state  owned  factories
and  mines.  Goods  have  been  used  as  bonus  payments  to  workers  who  are  assessed
to be the  most  productive.  Competitlon  for  these  goods  among  factory  workers
raises productLvity and  Le  socially productLve, i.e.,  Lt  reduces X-
ineffLcency. It seems LnapproprLate,  however,  to define  the allocation  of
goods  to  the  most  productive  workers  as  rent-seeking.  Rather,  it  is  equivalent
to the  government  taxing  the  goods  producing  sector  (by  requiring  delivery  of
the  goods  to the  government  at the  controlled  prLce  and  reselling  them  at  the
market  clearLng  price),  and  using  the  taxes  lt  receives  to  pay  bonus  payments
to workers.  Then  the  workers  are  merely  recoLving  higher  wages  in accordance
with  the  value  of  theLr  margin4T  product;  and  since  the  bonus  payments  induces
greater supply of effort,  the payments are not  rents. 39 Regardless of
whether  we call  the  payments  to  workero  a  bonus  wage  or a  rent,  the  key  point
L  that the Tullock  rectangle  L  not  dLosipated  rents  in thLe instance.  As41
discussed  in the text, there were also eases closer  to classical  eocially
wasted  rent  dissipation.  Thus,  the  extent  to  which  rent-seeking  disslpates  the
allocation  of rents in a soclally  wasteful  manner  depends  very  much on the
method  of allocation  of the  rento.
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discusoions  regarding  disequilibrium  viodelling,  including  the principle
derivation,  and  Elias  Dinopoulom.  Ro  .lsro%  thanks vArlnna  nff4r4ala  4n Iho
Polish  automobile  and  color  television  industries.  The  viewo  expreseed  are
those  of the  author  and  do not  necessarily  reflect  those  of  the  World  Bank
or those  cited.
1.  Another  reason  that  the  Polish  official  indices  exaggerate  the  decline  in
the standard  of living  is that they ignore  private  output,  which grew
significantly  in 1990.
2.  The Czechoslovakian price decontrol, trade and exchange rate reforms came
primarily in January 1991, whereas the  analogous Hungarian reforms
progressed  gradually  beginning  in  earnest  in  January  1989.
3.  Although  there  is  empirical  work  in  socialist  economies,  it  tends  to  focus
on macroeconomic  problems,  or be based  on highly  aggregated  data.  There
have been relatively few empirical analyses of  individual  markets.
Exceptions  include  Kapitany,  Kornai  and Szabo (1984),  Tarr (1990b)  and
Charemza,  Gronicki  and  Quandt  (1988).  The  latter  atudy  used  queuing  theory
to explain  the existence  of positive  excess  demand in the Polish  auto
market,  but  did not  estimate  either  the  positive  or normative  effects  of
reducing  price  controls  or import  restraints,  which  is our focus.  Deacon
and Sonstelie  (1985)  and  Alderman  (1987),  Lindsay  and  Feigenbaum  (1984)
and  Sah (1987)  are  papers  which  have  estimated  rent  seeking.46
4.  See Tarr (1990a),  The World Bank (1990)  or UNDP-World  Bank (1989)  for
further  detailo  of the  trade  regime  in Poland  Ln 1989.
5.  See Bhagwati (1978) for a survey and Tarr (1990a)  for an empirical
application  to Poland.
6.  Imports  from  Western  countrles  are  generally  for  hard currency  sales.
7.  Production  of automoblles  in Poland Ls done by two large state owned
enterprlseo,  based  on Fiat engineering.  A licenae  to  produce  t'h  no'_l:'
Flat  125p  wao  purchased  from  the  Itallan  auto-maker  Flat  in  the  mid-19600.
This  vehicle  L  produced  by  the  PolLsh  company  FS0,  at its  Warsaw  factory,
ln two  very similar  vereLons  now  called  the  FS0 1300  and  the FSO  1500.  A
llcense to produce the somewhat  less expenaLve  PolekL Flat  126p  was
purchased  from  Flat  ln  the  early  1970..  The  126p  is  produced  by  the  Polish
company F8M.  The most expensLve  Pollsh auto Ls the Polonez; it Ls
produced  by FSO, and  was dealgned  wlth  the  cooperation  of Flat.
8.  293,000  autos  were  produced,  but  116,000  were exported;  103,000  of these
were exported  to non-CMEA  countrLes.
9.  Moreover, there  is  a  state owned  company, POLMOZBYT, and  private
individuals  who  advertLee  in  newspapers  that  sell  cars  for  individuals  for
a commiesion.
10.  In  addition,  a  small  number  of cars  are  allocated  to the  domestlc  market
for  sale  for  hard  currency;  the  price  charged  for  these  vehicles  is close
to  the  free  market  price  for  domestic  vehicles,  but  sufficlently  high  that
few  are  sold.
11.  These estLmates  are from  Gazetas  IBankowa  No. 5, 1989, and are based  on
December  1988  data.
12.  Another source  of imports  worth mentioning  is the system  of "private"
importo  of autos  (and  color  TV.).  Individuals  can  travel  abroad  and  bring47
back an auto or Col-C TV. Although tariffs  on Ltuports  through  foreign
trade organizations are very low (see  the  data  appendix  for  %he details),
private imports are subject to a  special customs duty. The duty was high
enough  in 1985 to severely  rotard private imports; but  since it  is a
specific  duty in zloty, the high rate of Poliah inflation has made in
relatively unimportant.
13.  Previously, it  would have been necessary for some individualo to purchase
through the black market in order to satiefy their demands.
14.  Osband (1989)  argues that corruption in  the awarding of goods under price
controls  in  socialist  economies  will  be  efficiency  enhancing  because
individuals  will  compete  for  the  awards.  This  appears  to  be
oversimplified, however, since as the examples of the text indicate, some
awards  will  be  for  purely  wasteful  or  socially  counterproductive
activities.
15.  In fact, in an economy under generalized shortages, the  excess demand  for
goods implies from Walras Law an excess supply of money. Then payment in
kind will usually be a more effective method of inducing effort than cash
payments.
16.  Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984)  have  shown  that  rent  dissipation can occur
with waiting lists even when there  is no lobbylng type activLties. Their
model requires that  value of the product declines with delay of receipt,
due to considerations such as style changes or time of year of receipt.
Polish autos, whose style changed little from year to year, do not appear
to fit into the category of products they analyzed.
17.  increased production of domestic vehicles and color televisions reduces
the  demand  for  the  import  substitute,  but  this  has  no  effect  on  welfare48
because there is no  price change ln  the import  market, i.e., no change ln
the distortion.
18.  Since all autos produced under prlie control are consumed, there is no
substitutLon  effect for an  increase ln the  dox-NstLc  controlled price,
subject to contlnued exceas demand; but the  increaoe in the controlled
prlce leaves less income for the purchaee of all other gooda, including
imported autos. Moreover, the  domestic  free market price does not affect
import  demand  at  all,  because  it  simply  determines  rents  among  consumers
of  the  fixed  quantity  of  domestic  autos,  but  does  not  affect  the  aggregate
income  avaLlable  for  the  purchase  of  other  goods  by  consumers  in
aggregate.
19.  The policy  is  sLmulated  by  changlng  equatLon  4  in  appendix  A to  u*p*(l+t),
removLng price controls, and fLnding  the value of u  that yLelds imports ln
the origlnal equLllbrlum.  The implicit subsLdy Le then 1-u.
20.  Zn the LnitLal  equilLbrium,  the  data indLcate  that free  market autos sold
for 2.8 tLmes the controlled price, compared with a  ratio of 2 for color
TVs. Ceterus gAribus, freeing the price of domestLc autos should lead to
a  greater  ecpansion  of  domestic  production  and  a greater substLtution for
imported  autos;  this  in  turn  requires  a  greater  import  subsLdy  to  induce
an  increase  ln Lmports  to  their  origLnal  level.
21.  The parallel exchange rate, which was quite volatile, deprecLated by about
1000 zloty per US dollar  in April 1989.  Exact estimatLon of a shadow
eAchange  rate L,  of course, problema'ical.  The shadow exchange rate li
clearly  less than  the parallel rate, however, and these estLmates are
illustrative  of the  impact of appreciating the parallel  exchange rate
toward the shadow exchange rate.
22.  In fact, the devaluation of 1990 encouraged a masesive  export boom durLng49
the first  three quarters  of 1990,  until inflatlon  (Ln  slgnifLeant  part
caused by the oxport  boom wlth a fixed  exchange  rate) elLminatod  the
hlghly  favorable  exchange  rate  for  exporters.  See  the  abov  eLted
macroeconomic  papers  on Poland,  especLally,  Plnto,  CorLealli  and de la
Calle.
23.  Charomma  et al.  focused  on an  estimate  of  the  amount  of  excess  demand  for
autos. uaseoa  on our calibrated  demand  curve,  it ls straLghtforward  to
calculate  that excess  demand  for autos  iu 317  thousand  units  initially,
and  is reduced  to  232  thousand  units after  the lowerlng  of the lmport
prlce.
24.  We dLscuss  the  model  uslng  autos  as  the  example. The  arguments  also  apply
to color  TVs  unless  otherwise  stated.
25.  Thlo  equatLon  ls analogous  to  equation  11  of  Neary-Roberts  (1980),  except
that thelr demand functLon  for the unconstraLned  good ls compensated
(Hicksian).
26.  Among the other factors  af  fectLng  demand would be the supply,  of used
autos,  and  the  extent  of their  substitution  wlth  new  autos.
27.  ELther  profLt  maximLzatLon  of cost  plus  markup  prLcing  rules lead  to an
upsloping  supply  curve  glven  increasing  marglnal  costs.
28.  In the case  of color  TVs, e - 1.65 is assumed,  based  on estLmates  from
Shlells,  Deardorff  and  Stern (1986). Then  b - -. 03.
29.  In  the  case  of  color  TVs,  in  the  central  elastLeLty  case,  we take  the  own
prlce elasticitLes  to be - .855, based on the estimates  of Shlello,
Deardorf  and  Stern (1986).  We  also use thli source for the incom
elasticity,  which  is  1.65. The  supply  elasticLty  is  taken  to  be .5  ln  the
central  elasticity  case,  and  the  cross  elneticities,  which  are  derived  byso
the  procedures  explained  in  the  appendix  are  C *  .4;  b - -.004;  and  a  - -
1.32.
30.  Charemza  et al.  prefer  to  characterize  the  oituation  as  one  of  equilibrium
wlth excess  demand.
31.  The  data  were collected  by Bohdan  Wyznkoiewicz.
32.  The December  1988 prlce  was obtaLned  from  Gazeta  BAnkova,  No. 5, 1939.
I'he  nfeomhor  IQR7  nrie. w  ,  chtained  from the Statistical  Yeaarbok  of the
Central  StatistLcal.  Office,  p.405.
33.  Thli is the tarlf  l rate when the auto li Lmported  by of  fiLclal  "ForeLgn
Trade  OrganizatLons,"  (organLzatLons  lLcensed  to import")  of which  there
are now  many who are  in competLtLon. An indivLdual  who wanted  to import
for hli own  use  would pay a dLfferent tarLff rate, whlch was currently
approximately  5 percent  ln 1989.  The  tariff  rate on "personal  imports"
was suffLcLently  different  in 1986 and 1987 that personal  imports  were
reduced  by over 75 percent,  whlle  officlal  lmports  increased. By 1989,
inflation  had  eroded  the  personal  import  tariff  rate,  whlch  is a  speclflc
tariff.
34.  Rents  from  the granting  of a  monopoly  license  or quota  may  be  dissLpated
by competLtion  among  potential  reclplents  of  the  license.  A  strong  versLon
of thli  view  ls  represented  by  McCormLck,  Shugart  and  Tolllson  (1984)  who
contend  that the beneflts  of deregulation  are quite  small  because  rents
have been dios.pated  and cannot be recouped. Their argument ignores
continuing  rent dissLpatLon  in the allocation  rather than creation  of
rents,  such  as queulng.
Flowers (1987)  has noted that if the benefLts of creating the rent  are  not
divisible  among  potentLal  recipLents,  there  is  a free  rLder  problem  whlch51
may result in less than all the created rents being dissipated.  For
example,  if  a tariff  protects  all  members  of  a domestic  industry,  those
who  do not  invest  in  political  activity  to  obtain  the  tariff  can  free  ride
on those  who do.  As a result,  less  than  the full  amount  of the industry
rents from creation  of the tariff  will be invested  in the activity  of
obtaining  the  tariff.
35.  Fiu uawu,la,  6vilda  i.-'ca  c-=.rzIa  on gasolnle,  in  which initially  the
wasted time in the queue exactly offsets the rents received  on the
gasoline.  A price  taking  individual,  who anticipates  the  persistence  of
the price controls,  has an incentive  to buy a second  gas tank.  Having
purchased  the  second  tank,  the  value  of  the rents  received  after  waiting
in the  queue increase,  so individuals  with two tanks  will be willing  to
wait in  the  queue  longer  than  thcoe  with  only  one  gas  tank.  Eventually,  as
all consumers  buy second  gas tanks,  the queue  lengthens  until  the rents
are  Sully  dissipated  for  individuals  with  two  tanks.  But  then  society  has
incurred  the costs  of equipping  care with two gas tanks,  which is the
overdissipation  of the  rent.
36.  Tullock  (1980)  and  Rogerson  (1982)  have  characterized  situations  of  under
or over  dissipation  of  the  rents  in  a  bidding  model.  Higgins,  Shugart  and
Tollison (1985), however, show that in  an extension of  the  model
considered  by Tullock, if entry is endogenous,  rents are dissipated
expectationally.
37.  This method  has been utilized  in the allocation  of import  quotas,  most
notably  in New Zealand.
38.  Lobbying  would induce  a shift  in production  toward  good 1 if lobbying
activities  intensively  use  the factor  that  is  used intensively  in  good  2.
Then lobbying  will increase  the price of that factor  and the cost of52
production  of  good  2  relative  to  good  1,  which  will  lnduce  a shlft  of
resourcOs  toward  good  1.  AlternatLvely,  lobbylng  could  induce  a  shift  ln
resources  toward  good  2  if  lobbyLng  LntensLvely  uses  the  factor  used
LntensLvely  ln  good  1.  Then the  addltlonal  second  best  distortLon  is  added
to  the  wastod  rosources  of  lobbying.
39.  in  fact,  in  an  economy  under  generaliLed  shortages,  the  excess  demand for
goodf  implicc  frse  .alra'  La*;  - x^ --  -pply  of  money.  Then  payment  ln
kind  will  usually  be  a  more effective  method  of  inducing  effort  than  cash
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